Visualization-Mediated Alleviation of the Planning Fallacy by Dragicevic, Pierre & Jansen, Yvonne
HAL Id: hal-01500560
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01500560
Submitted on 3 Apr 2017
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - ShareAlike| 4.0 International
License
Visualization-Mediated Alleviation of the Planning
Fallacy
Pierre Dragicevic, Yvonne Jansen
To cite this version:
Pierre Dragicevic, Yvonne Jansen. Visualization-Mediated Alleviation of the Planning Fallacy. Geof-
frey Ellis. IEEE VIS 2014, Nov 2014, Paris, France. DECISIVe : Workshop on Dealing with Cognitive
Biases in Visualisations. ￿hal-01500560￿
Visualization-Mediated Alleviation of the Planning Fallacy
Pierre Dragicevic
Inria, France
pierre.dragicevic@inria.fr
Yvonne Jansen
University of Copenhagen
yvja@di.ku.dk
ABSTRACT
The planning fallacy, i.e., people’s tendency to underesti-
mate the time required to complete a project despite past
failures, is ubiquitous and resistant to coping strategies. We
propose scenarios where visualizations may help alleviate
this problem, motivated by previous research in psychology.
We hope that with the help of visualizations, people will be-
come more reliable in their judgments and work together in
a way that is both more productive and more gratifying.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The planning fallacy refers to people’s tendency “to under-
estimate the time required to complete a project, even when
they have considerable experience of past failures to live up
to planned schedules” [7]. This cognitive bias has been doc-
umented for a number of tasks, both in the lab and outside
the lab [3]. It has been regularly observed in many situa-
tions, including in large-scale industrial and public projects
where the monetary cost can be extremely high [4].
The planning fallacy is present in our everyday lives, both
private and professional, and has often negative individual
and social consequences. For example, a PhD student may
promise his supervisor to deliver a first draft of an article
three weeks before a deadline, but will fail to do so. Or
a supervisor may promise his students he will spend time
on all articles, but will end up working on only one article.
These poor judgments are counterproductive and can create
a climate of frustration and distrust in collaborative teams.
The planning fallacy is present in virtually all medium to
long-term projects, and is surprisingly resistant to coping
strategies: step-by-step plans, team planning, task familiar-
ity, motivation and incentives to finish on time usually exac-
erbate rather than reduce the planning fallacy [3]. Deadlines
do not eliminate the planning fallacy, as people often hope
to finish well in advance [3] (see Figure 1). The dominant
theory behind the planning fallacy [8] recommends to have
people focus on their past experience, but even this tech-
nique often fails, as people typically tend to consider past
mistakes as irrelevant [4]. Although there are individual dif-
ferences, the planning fallacy bears little relationship with
personality traits such as the tendency to procrastinate [2].
Figure 1: In a study by Buehler et al. [5], partici-
pants were asked to estimate for di↵erent levels of
confidence when they would finish some academic
projects. The numbers above the bars indicate how
many projects were actually finished in time. Figure
reproduced from Buehler et al. [3].
In this paper we propose that visualizations can help al-
leviate the planning fallacy. We suggest several possible
approaches motivated by previous empirical studies on the
planning fallacy. A few of these studies have achieved some
success, but their experimental manipulations are di cult
to implement in real-life situations. We hope that with the
help of visualizations, people will become more reliable in
their judgments and work together in a way that is both
more productive and more gratifying.
2. HOW VISUALIZATION CAN HELP
2.1 Increasing Awareness of Obstacles
The dominant theory behind the planning fallacy is the in-
side/outside account [8, 9, 4]: people focus on scenarios of
how the task will be completed (the “inside” perspective)
rather on how similar tasks have been carried out in the past
(the “outside” perspective). An inside perspective tends to
focus on best-case scenarios, ignoring the many ways the
project may go wrong, and downplaying past failures. One
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Figure 2: Screenshot of PlanningLines [1], a technique for visualizing plannings with temporal uncertainties.
A task is represented by a rectangle. On each rectangle, the left black cap encodes the interval between the
earliest and the latest starting times, while the right black cap captures the range of possible finishing times.
The bright yellow rectangle conveys maximum duration and the dark yellow rectangle encodes minimum
duration. Task dependencies are shown with arrows, as in Gantt charts.
intriguing consequence is that the more people plan for the
future, the more wrong they will be in their time estimates.
Studies have however shown that not all planning styles are
detrimental. Specifically, “unpacking” a project into smaller
components has been shown to reduce the planning fallacy,
because it forces people to become aware of tasks that were
not obvious before [9]. Similarly, helping people to consider
potential obstacles can be useful to some extent [3].
These findings have important consequences for the design
of personal information management tools (PIMs), such as
computer calendars and todo-list managers. Tools that take
a naive approach to planning may actually aggravate the
planning fallacy. PIM tools should support fine-grained task
decomposition, both in terms of input and visualization.
Users might also benefit from being able to set and visu-
alize confidence intervals for completion times, as well as
specify alternative plans in case things go wrong. Although
such tools have been studied for large-scale project man-
agement [6] (see Figure 2), they need to be adapted to a
larger audience. The temporal data structures involved are
much more complex than typically supported by PIM tools,
so designing such tools is a challenge. It is important that
the visualizations are easy to understand, navigate and up-
date on-the-fly. Only then will the tool encourage people to
adopt a better planning style, and help them become more
aware of hidden tasks and potential obstacles.
2.2 Selflogging of Durations and Predictions
The information visualization (infovis) community is more
and more interested in the collection of personal data for
personal purposes, an emerging movement that has been
popularized under di↵erent names such as selflogging [14] or
the quantified self [17]. One of the promises of selflogging
is to empower people by letting them discover patterns in
their own life for personal reflection and improvement [14].
There are several ways personal data logging and visualiza-
tion tools could help alleviate the planning fallacy. For ex-
ample, one can imagine that personal information on actual
project completion times and previous estimates is recorded
for later use by tools such as PIM tools (discussed above). At
any point in time, users could visualize the bias and variabil-
ity in their judgments. They could then use this information
to better estimate the future, e.g., by applying a“corrective”
factor derived from previous planning estimates.
One argument for such an approach is the memory bias ac-
count of the planning fallacy, which suggests that people
are optimistic in their planning not because they do not use
past experiences, but because they tend to underestimate
the time it took them to accomplish similar tasks [12]. Ac-
cording to Roy et al., “it may prove useful to keep records of
beginning and ending times for the task [...]. If this process
is repeated, then mean duration and variability can be com-
puted from which more precise predictions can be made.” [12].
However, it is still unclear which theory (the memory bias
account or the classic inside/outside account) is correct [3].
Nonetheless, we propose that recording both actual comple-
tion times and predictions could help people make better
predictions, irrespective of what causes the planning fallacy.
One di culty with this approach is that people tend to ig-
nore past information even when it is available [3]. For ex-
ample, software project managers often keep detailed records
about past projects, but rarely use them because they feel
that each new project is unique [3]. Even when people are
aware that they have been regularly late in the past, they
tend to consider that the future will be di↵erent, and they
create narratives to explain past mistakes [4].
We believe that data aggregation and information visualiza-
tion can mitigate this issue by hiding irrelevant contextual
information about the past. Consistent with this, several
studies suggest that neutral external observers are not sub-
ject to the planning fallacy: they do not have access to in-
formation on which to build narratives (i.e., explanations of
past failures and detailed best-case scenarios for the future),
and instead rely on objective sources of information such as
past performances [3]. Computers could, therefore, act as
neutral external observers that are more available and much
more reliable in information gathering than humans.
2.3 Tools for Supporting Group Predictions
Another intriguing result from past research on the plan-
ning fallacy is that groups are often worse at predicting
task completion times than individuals [3]. Group discus-
sion has been shown to increase focus on positive scenarios
and decrease focus on obstacles, but no detrimental e↵ect
was found for the process of agreeing on a particular forecast.
Therefore, teams should perhaps“collect and aggregate indi-
vidual forecasts, instead of engaging in group discussion” [3].
These findings have important implications for the design
of groupware tools. Tools that facilitate informal exchanges
(e.g., chat, email or videoconferencing tools) may exacer-
bate the planning fallacy [3]. On the other hand, a number
of groupware tools (e.g., shared calendars or planning tools
such as Doodle) tend to replace free information exchange
by more systematic, “colder” procedures. These apparent
limitations might actually turn out to be benefits for fore-
casting purposes. The idea that limiting exchange of infor-
mation can improve group decision making has been also
supported by research on the wisdom of the crowds [10].
Thus new groupware tools could be created that focus on col-
lecting, aggregating and visualizing anonymous predictions
when project completion times need to be estimated. Such
tools could also take into account the multidisciplinary na-
ture of teams, and collect and visualize a range of predictions
on subtasks for which people are experts. However, since
both performing a familiar task and occupying a position of
power [3] tend to worsen the planning fallacy, the system
should perhaps give more weight to people who are good
estimators rather than experts. Such a system could use
personal logging data about previous performances (as dis-
cussed previously), and compute weighted estimations while
ensuring privacy.
Based on findings that people not involved in a project are
better estimators, tools could also be designed that take in-
put from independent observers, such as other teams, anony-
mous crowdsource workers, or online communities [15]. For
example, PhD students could maintain a Web site that vi-
sualizes the many steps necessary to complete a thesis. Such
a visualization could aggregate personal data collected from
selflogging, or from the advanced PIM tools discussed before,
such as the “hidden” tasks necessary to complete a thesis or
the regularly experienced obstacles. Such online community
visualizations could in turn help users input more reliable
planning data to PIM tools. For example, they could apply
a “correction factor” for time estimates based on data from
multiple people instead of their own (necessarily limited)
experience.
2.4 Social Networking Tools
So far we mostly covered how computer tools and visualiza-
tions could help individual people and groups. We now turn
to social networks. Social networking tools are particular
in that they support the sharing of data with a relatively
stable set of privileged individuals — the person’s connec-
tions – instead of temporary teams or the whole Internet.
By allowing to share and visualize potentially sensitive in-
formation and by supporting trust building, such tools o↵er
extremely rich possibilities.
People usually care about trust when there is the possibility
of deception. Deception has been shown to be occasionally
associated with optimistic planning. For example, it can be
useful for political purposes to make overly optimistic pre-
dictions for the completion of large-scale public or industrial
projects [2]. More generally, people in a group can have con-
flicting interests, and some may be better served by an overly
optimistic planning than others. In this context, it could
make sense not to take all predictions at their face value, and
ask for guarantees. Such guarantees could be provided by
add-ons to professional social networking tools, where pro-
fessionals or institutions could advertise and visualize their
history of accurate predictions to potential partners. Indi-
viduals could advertise similar information to their friends
(e.g., being generally on time for meetings with friends), pro-
vided of course that they have incentives to do so. Bilateral
sharing agreements could provide such incentives.
It is safe to assume that overly optimistic plannings are gen-
erally the result of a genuine planning fallacy rather than a
deliberate attempt to deceive. Even in that case, people may
still benefit from accessing, sharing and visualizing personal
histories of past forecasting performances. Many people are
honest about the fact that they are rarely on time, be it
for meetings or completing projects. Such information is
likely to facilitate collaboration and mitigate both obsta-
cles to success and personal frustrations. Social networks
and visualization tools can greatly facilitate such informa-
tion sharing. Whether there is deception or not, sharing
such information may provide incentives for people to make
more realistic predictions, by the way of social pressure.
3. CONCLUSION
The planning fallacy is present in our everyday lives, both
private and professional, and has often negative individual
and social consequences. Among other things, it makes col-
laborations – e.g., coauthoring a workshop article – a less
rewarding experience. It is robust and resistant to coping
strategies, and the many experimental manipulations used
in empirical research only yielded limited successes [13, 11].
We believe that computers can help alleviate the planning
fallacy due to their ability to collect, process, dispatch and
visualize data. But existing information management and
communication tools need to be redesigned and new tools
should be developed based on lessons from the psychology
of the planning fallacy. We discussed several approaches, in-
cluding personal information management tools that encour-
age the externalization of hidden tasks and obstacles, log-
ging tools for self-awareness, groupware tools for aggregating
and visualizing people’s predictions and performances, and
finally social networking tools to support social awareness
of the planning fallacy and encourage behavior change. We
also suggested how each of these tools could benefit from
more emphasis on information visualization.
We contrasted deceptive optimistic planning with genuine
planning fallacy. It remains the intriguing possibility of
most systematic optimistic predictions being a complex mix
of both. This is our personal position. The extreme re-
sistance of the planning fallacy to deliberate attempts of
self-improvement supports this: if people know they were
wrong in the past, how can they possibly keep being wrong
over and over again? This suggests that overly optimistic
predictions may somehow benefit people who makes them.
An isolated but important study seems to confirm this [11]:
when people are asked to make verbal predictions, they ex-
hibit the planning fallacy, but the fallacy is eliminated if
they make anonymous predictions. The authors thus con-
clude that the planning fallacy may be caused by a desire to
present a favorable impression to others. This again provides
support for the design of computer tools that depersonalizes
communication for the purposes of accurate planning.
Pezzo et al. do not discuss whether the desire to present
a favorable impression is conscious or unconscious, nor do
they discuss why people ignore the unfavorable impression
that a later failure will likely give. A recent article on self-
deception may shed some light on these questions [16]. The
authors postulate that self-deception evolved to gain advan-
tages from others while preventing deception from being de-
tected, and minimizing punishment if the deception is dis-
covered. Although they do not address the planning fallacy,
in the commentaries Thomas Suddendorf proposes that “in
order to elicit cooperation on a project, one may benefit from
exaggerating the likelihood and positive consequences of suc-
cess (or negative consequences of failure)” [16]. Thus, the
planning fallacy may be the result of an unconscious mech-
anism that has evolved to foster other people’s cooperation.
This conjecture is consistent with the finding that people in
position of power exhibit more planning fallacy [3]. If this
turns out to be true, then the planning fallacy may be hard
or impossible to overcome, and we should perhaps focus on
designing social networking and visualization tools that pro-
mote accountability and social awareness rather than tools
that support planning and self-awareness for individuals.
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